Transportation networks currently experience congestion during times of peak use. Such networks are inflexible in terms of their capacity, i.e., supply. By comparison, transport demand is flexible. One approach to reducing this congestion is to reduce demand. The most common form of this is a ‘congestion tax’, which charges travelers more money during peak times on historically congested road segments. While a tax penalizes drivers for contributing to congestion, some system have been implemented in which drivers are rewarded for not contributing to congestion. Rewards can be delivered in many ways, for example: (a) qualifying drivers can be placed in a lottery, e.g., http://www.stanford.edu/˜balaji/societalnetworks.html; (b) qualifying drivers can be directly paid, such as http://roadpricing.blogspot.in/2011/10/opposite-of-congestion-pricing-and-it.html; or (c) qualifying drivers can receive virtual rewards which can be presented so as to encourage competition.
Another approach is to increase the capacity of the transportation network. This can be (a) permanent, e.g., through major infrastructure projects, or (b) temporary, e.g., through dynamic lane allocation. While congestion taxes have achieved some success, they are politically unpopular and have therefore not been widely adopted. Existing reward based systems verify travel either through special purpose devices added to vehicles or identification cards which are swiped upon arrival. This option has been used by businesses trying to encourage their employees to beat the morning rush hour.
Thus, existing rewards based systems fail to engage travelers in the journey selection process, and fail to take into account the unique needs and patterns of travelers. Existing systems associate rewards and taxes with specific road segments at specific times, and either fine travelers for journeys they do make, or reward travelers for journeys they do not make.